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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 








Cheryl Kates Esq. 
P.O. Box 734 
· Appeal . 
Control No.: 
Fairport, New York 14450 
04-016-19 SC 
March 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 · 
months. · · · · 
Cpppola, Smith 
Appellant '.s Letter:brief received' September 17, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the f\ppeals Unit's Findings and R~commendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript~ Parole 
Bo_ard Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Pl~. 
_·_Vacated, remarided for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, rema~ded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
.... / . . . 
_ Affirmed _ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
'If the Final Determination is a~ variance with Findings and 'Recommendation of Appeals Un~t; written 
reas~ns for th~ Parole B~ard's. det.er.mination must be anne~ed. here.to. · 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the sep~rate findin of 
the Parole Board, if any, ·were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on · . · ~b '/Jh _ ·. 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant'·s Counsel - Inst. Parole File .~ Central' File 
P.-2002(B) .(11/2018) . . 
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   Appellant challenges the March 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 24-month hold. Appellant’s underlying instant offense involved him being the head of a drug 
gang that sold over $2 million dollars per year in drugs. At the time of his arrest, appellant   
possessed in his desk one semi-automatic pistol and two revolvers, and also hundreds of bags of 
heroin, cocaine and marijuana. Appellant also incurred convictions in two other jurisdictions at 
this time as well (one federal and one from another State). Appellant raises the following issues: 
1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the 
Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the Board never 
stated what some of the sentences would be under the revised Rockefeller Drug Law amendments. 
3) the Board did not have the sentencing minutes from the other jurisdictions. 4) the sentencing 
minutes are illegible. 5) the Community Opposition contains false information and is based upon 
penal philosophy. 6) counsel’s FOIL requests were improperly denied. 7) the Board used crimes 
appellant was not convicted of, in violation of the due process clause of the constitution. 8) 
appellant will not be free if parole is granted, but rather must serve out sentences in other 
jurisdictions. 9) the decision lacks details. 10) the letter from the criminal defense lawyer was not 
read. 11) the jail time computations have errors. 12) the decision illegally resentenced him. 13) 
some of his criminal history was committed when he was a youth, but the Board didn’t consider 
youth and its attendant circumstances. 14) the decision was predetermined. 15) the Board failed to 
list the facts in support of the statutory standard that was cited. 16) the Board failed to comply with 
the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, and the 2017 regulations, in that the positive portions 
of the COMPAS were ignored, no valid reason for departing from the COMPAS was given, and 
the statutes are now evidence and rehabilitation based. Also, the COMPAS has errors. 17)  the 24 
month hold is excessive. 
 
   Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient 
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if 
such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his 
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of 
his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
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at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
 
   That the Board found appellant’s postconviction activities outweighed by the serious nature of 
his crimes does not constitute convincing evidence that the Board did not consider them, see Matter 
of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994), or 
render the decision irrational, see Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). 
   The Board decision may mention that he committed one offense while on parole. Matter of Webb 
v. Travis, 26 A.D.3d 614, 810 N.Y.S.2d 233 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Thompson v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter 
of Moore v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 1375, 26 N.Y.S.3d 412, 413 (3d Dept. 
2016). Matter of Ward v. New York State Div. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1375, 40 N.Y.S.3d 803 (3d 
Dept. 2016); Matter of Guzman v. Dennison, 32 A.D.3d 798, 799, 821 N.Y.S.2d 208, 208 (1st 
Dept. 2006). 
   The Board may emphasize the nature of the instant offense and that it was an escalation in illegal 
behavior.  See Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 
N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); Matter of 
Symmonds v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 6 
N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 
A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).    
   The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
   The Board may conclude that  high level drug trafficking   leads to violence, as long as there is some 
support in the record, even if the conviction is for drugs only. Comfort v New York State Division of 
Parole, 68 A.D.3d 1295, 890 N.Y.S.2d 700 (3d Dept. 2009). 
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         The risk in the crime of hurting innocent bystanders may also be considered.  Saunders v Travis, 
238 A.D.2d 688, 656 N.Y.S.2d 404, 405 (3d Dept 1997), leave to appeal denied 90 N.Y.2d 805, 661 
N.Y.S.2d 831 (1997).  
   The Board may emphasize the inmate’s failure to take responsibility for the criminal offense. Cruz 
v Alexander, 67 A.D.3d 1240, 890 N.Y.S.2d 656 (3d Dept. 2009); Abdur-Raheem v New York State 
Board of Parole, 78 A.D.3d 1412, 911 N.Y.S.2d 257 (3d Dept. 2010); Khatib v New York State 
Board of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014); Crawford v New York State 
Board of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016). The Board may consider the 
inmates minimizing of their role in the crime.  Serrano v New York State Executive Department-
Division of Parole, 261 A.D.2d 163, 689 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (1st Dept 1999). 
 
   The record reflects that the Board considered the sentence length the inmate would have received 
under Penal Law §70.70/70.71.  The Board was not required to explicitly mention or address the 
weight accorded this factor in its decision.  See Matter of Vaughn v. Evans, 98 A.D.3d 1158, 950 
N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (3d Dept. 2012) (inmate’s sentencing history was before the Board and it is not 
required to articulate each statutory factor it considers or the weight accorded to each factor). 
  The sentencing minutes are not illegible. Nor is the Board required to have the sentencing minutes 
for the current out-of-jurisdiction convictions. 
 
   Per 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8006.3, the Appeals Unit lacks subject matter jurisdiction on FOIL matters. 
  
   The fact that a grant of parole in New York would not lead to appellant’s release, but rather, the 
beginning a lengthy prison sentence in another jurisdiction, does not mean a Board denial is 
irrational bordering on impropriety. Perez v Evans, 76 A.D.3d 1130, 907 N.Y.S.2d 701 (3d Dept. 
2010). 
   As for not entertaining community opposition, appellant seeks to void the First Amendment. The 
right of citizens to petition the government extends to all departments of the government. 
Calififornia Motor Transport Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 
L.Ed2d 642 (1972).  A decision will not be reversed simply because material expressing personal 
penal philosophy was included in submissions which were otherwise properly considered.  See 
Matter of Duffy v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 132 A.D.3d 1207, 1209, 
19 N.Y.S.3d 610 (3d Dept. 2015) (“The Board’s decision will be upheld if there is nothing 
indicating it was influenced by, placed weight upon, or relied upon any improper matter, in the 
victim’s family statement or otherwise”). See also Matter of LaBarbera v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, Index No. 12711/18, Decision/Order of Jan. 17, 2019 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Co.) (Mott, J.S.C.) 
(Board properly considered community opposition and no indication Board relied on erroneous 
assertions); Matter of Bottom v. Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Index No. 902448-17, 
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Judgment dated Jan. 10, 2018 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (DeBow A.S.C.J.) (there was no indication 
Board was influenced by improper objections predicated solely on victims’ police officer status); 
Matter of Bailey v. New York State Div. of Parole, Index No. 973-16, Decision & Judgment dated 
Aug. 17, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (Hartman A.J.S.C.) (even assuming PBA letters contained 
inaccuracies or were inflammatory, Board would be permitted to consider them for what they were 
worth per Duffy and will be presumed not to have relied on inappropriate matters therein unless 
decision indicates otherwise). 
    The Board may consider all of the circumstances surrounding the conviction, including conduct 
for which the inmate was not convicted, as long as evidence of said conduct is in the record, and 
it is not the sole basis for the Board’s decision. Williams v Travis, 11 A.D.3d 788, 783 N.Y.S.2d 
413 (3d Dept. 2004); Nunez v Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 1240, 857 N.Y.S.2d 810 (3d Dept. 2008); 
Fransua v Alexander, 52 A.D.3d 1140, 860 N.Y.S.2d 327 (3d Dept. 2008); Brower v Alexander, 
57 A.D.3d 1060, 867 N.Y.S.2d 801(3d Dept. 2008)  lv. den. 12 N.Y.3d 707, 879 N.Y.S.2d 53. 
   The letter from appellant’s former criminal defense lawyer was considered. There is a 
presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders.  See 
People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People 
ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d 
Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in 
fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000). There 
is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense.  Matter of 
Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of 
Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000). Nor 
was any penal philosophy discussed. Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption that the 
Board complied with its duty.  See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.2d 
412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dept. 1985). 
 
   That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) 
in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 
2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  Matter 
of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d 
Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 
796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release 
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as “contrary to the best interest of the community”); Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 
920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale). 
   The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
   Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
   An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of 
a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 
99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
   Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on 
which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018). Parole release is a statutory grant of a restricted form of liberty prior to the 
expiration of a sentence. Johnson v Superintendent Adirondack Correctional Facility, 174 A.D.3d 
992, 106 N.Y.S.3d 408 (3d Dept. 2019). 
   The Board was aware of appellant’s age when reviewing his prior criminal history. But the cases 
dealing with youth and its attendant circumstances are inapplicable in that instance. 
 
   Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and 
without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d 
Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason 
or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  Siao-Paul 
v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State Board of Parole, 
169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019). 
   The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
   In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
   Concerning the alleged jail time computation errors, appellant didn’t raise them during the 
interview, thereby waiving the issue. Matter of Morrison v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1073, 916 N.Y.S.2d 
655 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 
2000); Matter of Shaffer v. Leonardo, 179 A.D.2d 980, 579 N.Y.S.2d 910 (3d Dept. 1992); Boddie 
v New York State Division of Parole, 288 F.Supp.2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). In any event, this issue 
was discussed at length with appellant during the interview and played no part in the decision. As 
such, the Board did not rely on erroneous information. Paniagua v Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1018, 56 
N.Y.S.3d 894 (3d Dept. 2017). As such even if an error does exist, it would be harmless error at 
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most. Matter of Rossney v. New York State Division of Parole, 267 A.D.2d 648, 649, 699 
N.Y.S.2d 319 ( 3d  Dept 1999); Khatib v New York State Board of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 
N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014). 
   Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law 
is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 
2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 
A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law amendments 
have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017. 
  The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do 
not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. 
Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851.  
   Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do 
not represent an evidentiary or rehabilitation/forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be 
the fundamental basis for release decisions.  This proposition is not supported by the language of 
the statute itself, considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of 
any substantive change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration 
process.  In 2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and 
needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–
c(4).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of 
Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter 
of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter 
of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 
1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was 
never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs 
information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, 
the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case 
review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense.  Executive 
Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The 
amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply 
when deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS 
instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  
Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the 
statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied.  
See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d 
Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017). The Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other 
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statutory factors.  Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017); accord Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 
2017).The Board still is entitled to place greater emphasis on the instant offense.  See Matter of 
Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter 
of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Lewis v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). 
   Amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) did not alter this approach.  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 
27, 2017 at 2 (reaffirming “any [risk and needs] instrument used is not dispositive”).  Indeed, the 
COMPAS does not (and cannot) supersede the Board’s authority to determine, based on members’ 
independent judgment and application of section 259-i(2)(c)(A)’s factors, whether an inmate should 
be released.  See 2011 N.Y. Laws ch. 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 1; Matter of Montane, 116 
A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The amended regulation was intended to increase 
transparency in the Board’s decision making by providing an explanation if and when the Board 
departs from scales in denying an inmate release.  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 
2.   
 
   The decision is consistent with amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as there is no departure to 
explain.  That is, the Board’s decision was not impacted by a departure from a scale within the 
assessment. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.   In fact, the Board cited the COMPAS 
instrument in its denial. 
 
   Appellant did not raise any alleged COMPAS errors during the interview, thereby waiving the 
issue. Matter of Morrison v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1073, 916 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter 
of Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000); Matter of Shaffer v. 
Leonardo, 179 A.D.2d 980, 579 N.Y.S.2d 910 (3d Dept. 1992); Boddie v New York State Division 
of Parole, 288 F.Supp.2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 
   The Board’s decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 24 months is within the 
Board’s discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b).  Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 
N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also 
Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013).  In the absence 
of impropriety, the reconsideration date set by the Board will not be disturbed.   Matter of Tatta v. 
State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 908, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002); accord 
Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 831 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 
2006) (rejecting challenge to 24-month hold). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
